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INTRODUCTION

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
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of speech, . . . ."' In 1947, the Supreme Court interpreted this First
Amendment Clause, in Everson v. Board of Education,2 to require a
"wall of separation" between church and state. Since Everson, the
Court has slowly become more permissive toward governmental action
involving religious matters. Most recently, the United States Supreme
Court, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,4 favored the protection of free religious speech over the separation of church and state. Therefore, while acknowledging a continuing
conflict between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment
Clause, the Court has apparently torn down the "wall of separation."
In Rosenberger, the respondent, University of Virginia (the University), withheld payments to a printer on behalf of the petitioner's
student group, Wide Awake Productions (WAP). The respondent
claimed that WAP's newspaper, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective
at the University of Virginia, violated the University's Student Activities Fund (SAF) guidelines, in that it "primarily promotes or manifests
a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."' The
petitioner alleged that the refusal to authorize payment violated their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the University6 concluding that: (1) the
SAF was not a "limited public forum;" (2) the application of the
funding guidelines did not result in viewpoint discrimination; and (3)
the denial of funds did not burden the plaintiff's exercise of religious
freedom.7 In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that
the University justified its use of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination to comply with the Establishment Clause.'

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding public transportation for both public and parochial

students).
3. Id. at 18.
4. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), rev'g 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
5. Id. at 2512.
6. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175 (W.D.
Va. 1992).
7. Id. at 180-83.
8. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.
1994), rev'd 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the
University's guidelines, both in their terms and in their application,
were a denial of the petitioner's right of free speech and amounted to
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.9 Furthermore, the Court
held that the governmental program at issue was neutral toward religion and there was no suggestion that the University created its program to advance or aid a religious cause.'0 Therefore, the necessity
of complying with the Establishment Clause did not excuse the discrimination."
The Supreme Court framed the issue in Rosenberger as follows:
Whether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to exclude
an otherwise eligible student publication from participation in the student
activities fund, solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such
exclusion would violate the Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint of

the publication were non-religious. 2

A 5-4 majority 3 held that "[t]here is no Establishment Clause violation in the University honoring its duties under the Free Speech
14
Clause.
This Comment will (1) give a summary of the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence; (2) explore the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger; and (3) speculate on the effect Rosenberger will
have on future Establishment Clause cases.

9. 115 S. Ct. at 2520.
10. Id. at 2522.
11. Id. at 2524.
12. Id. at 2521.
13. Kennedy, J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, & Thomas, JJ., filed concurring
opinions. Souter, J.,filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.,
joined.
14. 115 S.Ct. at 2525.
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BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

A. Early Establishment Clause Analysis
In 1947, the Supreme Court established the "strict separationist"
view of the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education,"5 and erected the "wall of separation" between church and
state. 6 In Everson, the Court wrote extensively on the history of the
First Amendment and its constitutional origins, and concluded that the
"First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state [and]
[that wall must be kept high and impregnable."' 7 However, since
Everson, several Justices have repeatedly rejected the "wall" metaphor. 8 For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 9 Chief Justice Burger
stated that "the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."2 Chief Justice Burger also stated, in Lynch v. Donnelly,2 that "the metaphor itself is not a wholly
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in
fact exists between church and state."'
Finally, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,' Justice Rehnquist declared that:
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in
Everson....
The 'wall of separation between church and state' is a
metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a
guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. "

15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The
Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV.

671, 672 (1990) [hereinafter Lewis & Vild].
17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.

18. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 672 n.11.
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 614.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 673.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Id. at 106-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the "wall" was never sturdy and produced various unpredictable applications. For instance, in Everson, the Court upheld public transportation for both public and parochial students. While in
McCollum v. Board of Education,26 the same Court struck down optional religious instruction in public schools.' Furthermore, four
years later in Zorach v. Clauson," the Court upheld the release of
students from public school classes to attend private religious classes.29 Although the Supreme Court decided all of these cases while
presumably applying the "wall of separation" principle, the results are
not consistent with the strict separationist view. Accordingly, the
Court's decisions failed to30 produce a consistent analytical framework
for future courts to follow.
In 1963, the Court introduced a two-step Establishment Clause
analysis in Abington Township School District v. Schemp.3 ' The
Court held that in order to withstand scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause, the government action must have a secular purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.32 The Court
in Abington Township intended the two-step-test to remain within the
strict separation doctrine while providing an analytical framework for
Establishment Clause analysis.33
In 1970, the Court decided Walz v. Tax Commission34 which
added a third step to Establishment Clause analysis: there must not be
"excessive government entanglement with religion."35 The Court held
that it was not enough to determine that the property tax exemption
was not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, but

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Id. at 212.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 315.
Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 672.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. at 222.
Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 673.
397 U.S. 664 (1970) (approving a tax exemption for church property).
Id. at 667.
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the end result must not involve an excessive government entanglement
with religion.36 In Walz, the Court acknowledged that some interaction between church and state will occur.37 For example, the Walz
Court noted that government provided fire and police protection results in unavoidable church and state interaction. 38 However, the Establishment Clause prohibits an excessive entanglement.39 Therefore,
the Court determined that the tax exemption would result in less
entanglement than would enforcing the payment of taxes by religious
organizations.'
Finally, in 1971, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman4 synthesized
the two step process set forth in Abington with the excessive entanglement doctrine of Walz into what became the benchmark of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.42 The three-pronged Lemon test required the govemment action to (1) have a secular purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect, and
(3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.43 The aesthetic simplicity of the test and the unanimous decision by the Court
were the keys to the Lemon test becoming the standard for Establishment Clause analysis."
B.

Development of the Endorsement Test

Since the Lemon decision, the make-up of the Court has changed
considerably.45 Justice O'Connor, who joined the Court in 1981, has

36. Id. at 674.
37. Id. at 675.
38. 397 U.S. at 676.
39. Id. at 675 (upholding a property tax exemption for religious organizations because
it would entangle government and religion less than would tax valuation, tax liens, tax
foreclosures and related procedures).

40. Id. at 674.
41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
42. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 673.
43. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
44. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 673.
45. Between 1970 and 1984, four members of the Court retired and were replaced.
Justice Powell replaced Justice Black and Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan in
1971; Justice Stevens replaced Justice Douglas in 1975; and Justice O'Connor replaced
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had a significant impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' She
led the Court in proposing a revision of the secular purpose and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test. These revisions would focus
the analysis on government endorsement of religion.47 The introduction of the endorsement analysis occurred in three principal cases:
Lynch v. Donnely," Wallace v. Jaffree,49 and School District v.
Ball."
In Lynch, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Christmas display erected in a private park within the city's shopping district.5 The display included a Santa Clause house, reindeer pulling a
sleigh, a Christmas tree, a talking wishing well, several hundred colored lights and a creche (nativity scene).52 Of the five Justices remaining from the Lemon Court, three53 found that displaying the
creche failed the three-pronged test, while two 5" believed the creche
was acceptable in its secular surrounding. The four new Justices were
also divided and in the end, Justice O'Connor provided the swing
vote by joining the majority in favor of allowing the creche. 5
In deciding Lynch, the majority applied the Lemon test and expressly rejected the "wall of separation" view from Everson.56 The
Justice Stewart in 1981.
46. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 673.

47. Id. at 678.
48. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of a Christmas display
erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in a private park within the city's shopping district).
49. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (finding unconstitutional an Alabama statute providing for a
moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer in school).
50. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (finding unconstitutional a school district's shared time education program for public school instruction at private, parochial schools).

51. 465 U.S. at 668.
52. Id. at 671.
53. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmnun.
54. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White.
55. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 674.
56. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 760 (1973), the Court stated:
[The wall] metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical
aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state. . . . "It
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total
separation . . . . Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church
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rejection of the "wall of separation" indicated that the Court was
adopting a more permissive stance with respect to the relationship
between government action and religious matters." However, Justice
O'Connor, agreeing with the majority in the outcome but not necessarily in the more permissive stance, wrote a separate concurring
opinion to "suggest a clarification in our Establishment Clause doctrine."' 8 Out of concern for the religious minority, Justice O'Connor
suggested a shift in the focus of the purpose and effect inquiry toward detecting governmental "endorsement" of religion. 9 Justice
O'Connor wrote:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to
a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community.... [Governmental endorsement of religion] sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.'

Under this revised test, Justice O'Connor concluded that the creche
did not violate the Establishment Clause.6'
In the second case, Wallace v. Jaffree,62 the majority for the
first time considered endorsement when applying the Lemon test. In
Wallace, the Court reviewed an Alabama statute that provided for a

and state ....

").

57. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
58. Id. at 687.

59. Id. at 690. Justice O'Connor states her revised approach as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is
to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective
of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question
should render the challenged practice invalid.
Id.

60. Id. at 687-88.
61. Id. at 694 ("I cannot say that the particular creche display at issue in this case
was intended to endorse or had the effect of endorsing Christianity.").
62. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."'6 Justices
Powell and O'Connor joined the four dissenters of Lynch' to strike
down the prayer statute under the Establishment Clause. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, began his three-pronged Lemon
analysis with a reference to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
from Lynch.65 The majority found that the state had violated the Establishment Clause and framed its conclusion in the language of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test.'
Finally, in School District v. Ball,67 the Court embraced the "endorsement" analysis when the majority opinion focused on the effect
of the questioned programs." Decided only a month after Wallace,
Ball addressed public school instruction at private, parochial schools.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the majority, and for the first
time he used the endorsement test to invalidate a government action.
Justice Brennan referred to the physical proximity of the public and
parochial instruction as a "powerful symbol of state endorsement and
encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same [classrooms]
at some other time in the day."6 9 Based upon this, and other more
straightforward Lemon violations, Justice Brennan concluded that the
school programs violated the Establishment Clause by having the

63. Id. at 40.
64. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
65. 472 U.S. at 56 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring), the
Court held that "[i]n applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion').
66. Id. at 60. The Court stated:
The legislature enacted [the statute] . . . for the sole purpose of expressing the
State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each
school day. The addition of 'or voluntary prayer' indicates that the State intended
to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.
Id. (emphasis added).
67. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
68. Id. at 383.
69. Id. at 392.
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effect of promoting religion. ° Justice O'Connor again wrote a brief
separate opinion focusing on Justice Brennan's effect analysis."
Lynch, Wallace, and Ball represent the evolution of the Court's
Establishment 'Clause analysis. Throughout the evolution, Justice
O'Connor, writing in separate opinions, has struggled to define the
endorsement test and win over a majority of the Court.
C. A More Recent View of Establishment Clause Analysis
1. The Endorsement Analysis
During the October 1988 term, the Supreme Court, in deciding
two cases, Texas Monthly v. Bullock72 and County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union," confirmed that the endorsement test
had become a part of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Texas
Monthly, the Court addressed a Texas statute exempting magazine
subscriptions from state sales tax. 4 Texas had also specifically exempted religious periodicals from this tax.75 However, from 1984 to
1987, Texas eliminated the exemption for magazines in general, while
maintaining the exemption for religious periodicals. The appellant,
Texas Monthly, Inc., paid $150,000 in sales tax and sued to recover
the payments on Establishment Clause and free press grounds.76 The
state trial court found that the religious exemption violated both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause, and struck down
the tax on non-religious periodicals.' The Texas Court of Appeals,
applying Lemon, reversed the trial court.78

70. Id. at 397.
71. Id. at 398-400.
72. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
73. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (West 1982).
75. Id. (Texas exempted "[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious
faith and that consist wholly of writings .promulgating the teaching of the faith and books
that consist wholly of writings sacred to religious faith").
76. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5-6.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
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In the United States Supreme Court decision, authored by Justice
Brennan, the Court decided that the trial court had properly concluded
that the religious exemption violated the Establishment Clause.7 9 Justice Brennan used an endorsement analysis to determine whether the
statute had a secular or neutral purpose and effect.8" Justice Brennan
reasoned that the fact that a government action benefits religious
groups does not affect its constitutionality if it also benefits a large
number of nonsectarian groups and has a legitimate secular end.8
But when government directly subsidizes religious groups exclusively,
"[it] 'provides unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious
organizations' and cannot but 'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to
slighted members of the community."82 Because the Texas statute
directly benefited religious publications without benefiting all publications, the community would automatically perceive that the government was endorsing religion; therefore, it was a per se violation of
the Establishment Clause.
In the second case, Allegheny County, the ACLU challenged two
holiday displays in Pittsburgh as violative of the Establishment
Clause. The first display was a creche located on the grand staircase of the county courthouse. The second was a Chanukah menorah
erected outside the city-county building. The district court, relying on
Lynch, held that both displays were merely parts of larger holiday
displays and therefore were constitutional. 4 The Third Circuit reversed, distinguishing Lynch, and held that the displays were unconstitutional endorsements of religion. 5

79. Id. at 7.
80. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 9 (stating that Justice O'Connor's Wallace concurrence "properly emphasized" this point, Justice Brennan noted, "Lemon's inquiry as to the
purpose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is
to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement").
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 15 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishops of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amons, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
83. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 587-88.
84. Id. at 588.
85. Id. at 588-89.
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the threepronged Lemon test and went on to explicitly adopt the endorsement
analysis. Justice Blackmun quoted Justice O'Connor's definitive interpretation of the Lemon test from Lynch: "The Establishment Clause,
at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community."' 86 Next, the Court looked at the creche display and
determined that it was the center of that particular Christmas display
and there were very few additional secular displays involved. In this
particular setting, the creche sent a message of religious endorsement
and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.87 The menorah, however, was surrounded by a Christmas tree and a sign entitled "Salute
to Liberty." Because these other elements of the display were secular,
the menorah took on the attributes of the surronding elements and did
not violate the 'Endorsement Clause.88
The significance of the Court's opinion in Allegheny is that it
confirmed the indications in Texas Monthly that the Court had adopted the endorsement test.89 The Court revised the purpose and effect
prongs of the Lemon test according to Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinions.'
2.

The Lemon Test Survives

Although the endorsement test has become a part of Establishment Clause analysis, the Lemon test has not been abandoned. In a
1993 case, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches, the majority continued
to use the Lemon test.9 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a

86. Id. at 594 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
87. Id. at 601-02.
88. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 617-18. ("[in these circumstances, then, the
combination of the tree and the menorah communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of
both Christian and Jewish faith, but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled
with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition").
89. Lewis & Vild, supra note 16, at 684.
90. Id.
91. Lamb's Chapel v. Center of Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss1/14

12

Hicks: The Wall Crumbles: A Look at the Establishment Clause Rosenberger

1995]

ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR

school board violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
when it denied access to school premises, outside of school hours, to
a church seeking to show a film dealing with family issues. The
school board refused to give the Church access to the school solely
because the film was based on a religious viewpoint.9 2
The Supreme Court first concluded that the school board had
opened the school for a wide variety of communicative purposes
making it a limited public forum.' Therefore, since it appeared the
school board would have allowed films about family issues if they
had not been from a religious viewpoint, the Court held that the
school board had participated in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.94 The school board tried to defend its position by arguing that
to allow a religious viewpoint to be displayed on school grounds
would violate the Establishment Clause.9" The Court applied the
Lemon test to address that argument and found that allowing the
church to use the school would not offend the Establishment
Clause.96 In applying the three-prong Lemon test, the Court found
that "[t]he challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does
not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with reli''
gion. M
Justice White, delivering the opinion for the majority, also remained loyal to the endorsement analysis stating that "[u]nder these
circumstances, ... there would have been no realistic danger that the
community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any

(1993) rev'g 959 F. 2d 381 (1992).
92. Id. at 2147.
93. Id. at 2146 (The school was not required to open its facilities for after hours use
by groups in the community. However, once the school had opened its facility to after
hours use for a wide variety of communicative purposes and groups, the school had
created a limited public forum. The restrictions applied by the school must satisfy the
same constitutional limitations as restrictions in traditional public areas such as sidewalks
and parks.).
94. Id. at 2147.
95. Id. at 2148.

96. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
97. Id.
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particular creed . . . ."" Justice O'Connor must have been satisfied
with the majority's use of the endorsement analysis, since this is one
of the few Establishment Clause cases in which she did not file a
separate opinion.
However, while Lemon has not been abandoned, it may not be
the benchmark it once was. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Lamb's Chapel agreed with the majority's judgment, but departed
from the Court's use of the Lemon test.99 Justice Scalia compared
the Court's use of the Lemon test to "some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . ."" Justice Scalia explained that there were numerous examples of the Court's selective
use of the Lemon test. For example, when the Court desires to overrule a practice the test forbids, they use it;"'l when the Court desires
to uphold a practice the test forbids, they ignore it entirely."° Furthermore, the Court at times merely used the test as a "helpful
signpost."10 3 Because Justice Scalia felt the Lemon test suffers from
intermittent use and a lack of clear precedential value, he declined to
apply Lemon."
3.

Religious Neutrality -

Not Hostility

The majority in Lamb's Chapel stated that it is the requirement
of government neutrality toward religion that explains why the Court
has held that schools may not discriminate against religious groups by
denying them equal access to facilities made available to the general
public." A significant factor in recent Establishment Clause cases is
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striling down state remedial
education programs administered in part in parochial schools).
102. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislative
chaplains).
103. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a state action aiding
colleges by issuing revenue bonds for capital projects, some of which might be used by
sectarian schools).
104. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150.
105. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2511 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
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the revitalized focus on neutrality toward religion. While a general
requirement of neutrality is not new, as the Court considered neutrali1 6 it may have a greater impact on the Court's
ty in Everson,"
analysis.
In Board of Education v. Grumet,1°7 the majority clearly emphasized neutrality as a general principle in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, stating "[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise and
the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' toward religion."'"8 Additionally, the Court noted that
"[neutrality] is well grounded in our case law as we have frequently
relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided
religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause
Challenges.""°
Furthermore, the Court has often held that the message is one of
neutrality, rather than hostility, toward religion.'
Justice O'Connor
best enunciated the principle in her concurring opinion in Kiryas:
We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat
people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or don't worship. The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion. The
Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion, religious
ideas, religious people, or religious schools. It is the Court's insistence on
disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New York to favor it here. The
Court should, in a proper case, be prepared to reconsider Aguilar, in order
to bring our Establishment Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is
the proper track-government impartiality, not animosity, towards religion."'
Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)).
106. 330 U.S. at 18 (Noting that the First Amendment requires the state to be neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions,
than it is to favor them.).
107. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (holding unconstitutional a statute creating a special
school district for religious enclave of Satmar Hassidim, practitioners of strict form of
Judaism).
108. Id. at 2486 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792-93).
109. Id. at 2491 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
110. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion); see also Board of Educ. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
111. 114 S. Ct. at 2497 (citations ommitted) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The University of Virginia collects a mandatory fee per semester
from all full-time students and deposits the proceeds in the Student
Activities Fund (SAF)."' The University then uses the SAF to support a wide variety of student organizations, activities, and publications.' 3 To qualify for funds from the SAF, a student group must
first be declared a "Contracted Independent Organization" (CIO)." 4
CIOs have access to the University facilities, as well as, the right to
apply for SAF funds." 5 The standard CIO agreement states that benefits provided to qualified groups by the University "should not be
misinterpreted as meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the University is responsible for the
organizations or other acts or omissions, or that
the University ap'' 16
activities.
or
goals
organizations'
the
of
proves
The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia is the corporate body responsible under state law to promulgate the guidelines
for the awards of SAF monies." 7 These guidelines charge the Student Council with administering the SAF "in a manner consistent with
the educational purpose of the University as well as with State and
Federal law.""' The guidelines prohibit several categories of student
organizations from obtaining SAF funds "according to the nature of
the organization and the purpose for which the funds would be
used.""' 9 For example, "[a]lthough they may attain CIO status, fraternities and sororities, political and religious organizations, and
groups whose membership policies are exclusionary in nature are

concurring in the judgment).
112. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 270.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id.

116. Id. at 270-71.
117. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.

118. Id.
119. Id.
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ineligible for SAF funding."'2 The guidelines also exclude the following expenditures and activities: (1) honoraria or similar fees; (2)
religious activities; (3) social entertainment and related expenses; (4)
philanthropic
contributions and activities; and (5) political activi12 1
ties.
Once a student organization is declared a CIO and eligible for
funding, it submits expense vouchers which the University pays if that
particular expense is fundable under the guidelines." The University
pays the SAF monies directly to the group's creditors to discharge the
fundable expense." For the academic year 1990-91, 343 student organizations qualified as CIOs. Of these 343 groups, 135 applied for
SAF funding, and the University awarded SAF monies to 118
groups.24 Numbered among the funded organizations were fifteen
student publications; also included were the Muslim Students Association, 5the Jewish Law Students Association, and the C.S. Lewis Soci12
ety.
In September 1990, Ronald W. Rosenberger, an undergraduate at
the University, founded Wide Awake Productions (WAP).'" WAP's
constitution states that it is an unincorporated association with the
stated purpose of (1) "publishing a magazine of philosophical and
religious expression"; (2) "facilitating discussion which fosters an
atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints";
and (3) "providing a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural
backgrounds."'2 WAP publishes Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia (Wide Awake). Wide Awake and
WAP are not affiliated with any religious institution."

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271-72.
Id. at 272.
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Wide Awake's mission is two-fold: "to challenge Christians to
live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim[,] and to
encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus
Christ means."'29 In furtherance of this mission, Wide Awake "offers
a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues especially those relevant to University of Virginia students.' 30
WAP attained CIO status shortly after its founding.13 ' The University granted WAP the same access to the university facilities as
other CIOs. 132 Such access included the use of the University property for the group's meetings, functions, programs, and access to the
University computer terminals, printers, and other equipment for pre33
paring its manuscripts for publication.
In January -1991, WAP submitted an application for SAF funding
to cover publishing costs for Wide Awake. 3 1 On February 26 of that
year, the Appropriations Committee denied WAP's application, stating:
In reviewing the request by Wide Awake Productions, the...
committee determined your organization's request could not be funded as
it is a religious activity. This determination was made after reviewing
your first issue of Wide Awake. In particular, the committee noted in
your Editor's Letter that the publication was "a forum for Christian
expression" and a means "to challenge Christians (in how) to live" ....
Please be aware that this decision simply denies Student Activity Fee
funding for your publication. Wide Awake Production may still print and
distribute issues on Grounds.'35

After exhausting all avenues of appeal within the University, on
July 11, 1991, Rosenberger, as president of WAP, brought action in
the district court.33 Rosenberger's complaint alleged three counts.
Count one alleged that the guidelines' proscription of SAF funding for
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id.

135.

Id.

136. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175 (W.D.
Va. 1992).
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the publication costs of Wide Awake violated the Free Speech and
Press Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by: (1) unlawfully depriving the members of WAP government
benefits solely because of the content and viewpoint of their speech in
Wide Awake; and (2) illegally excluding members of WAP from the
"limited public forum" created by the Rector and Visitors' establishment of the SAF and promulgation of the funding guidelines. 37
Count two of Rosenberger's complaint maintained that the
committee's denial of SAF funding to "religious activities" violated
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution by discriminating in the granting of a government benefit
based upon (1) the religious content of the expression in Wide Awake;
and (2) the
religious beliefs, character, or affiliation of the members
8
of WAP1

3

Count three of the complaint alleged that the guidelines' prohibition against subsidizing "religious activit[ies]," coupled with the
committee's denial of SAF funds to WAP, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 39 Specifically, count three contended (1) that the guidelines
denied WAP the benefits to which other students and CIOs were
entitled by unconstitutionally discriminating against WAP on the basis
of the content or viewpoint of its members' speech and association;
and (2) that the guidelines unconstitutionally discriminated against
WAP's religious speech by denying it the benefits that other students
and CIOs engaged in religious speech and activities receive and have
received."4
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Rector and Visitors on each count of Rosenberger's complaint, concluding: (1) that the SAF was not a "limited public forum;" (2) that
application of the funding guidelines did not result in viewpoint or

137.
138.
139.
140.

Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
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content discrimination against the speech of WAP; and (3) that the
denial of funding did not burden WAP's free exercise of religion.'4 '
On appeal, he Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and
found that the guidelines did discriminate based on content.'42 The
circuit court ruled that, although the Constitution does not require the
state to underwrite speech, a presumptive violation of the Free Speech
Clause existed when the University denied third-party payment otherwise available to CIOs.
However, the circuit court affirmed the
district court's judgment by holding that a "compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and state" justified the
University's viewpoint discrimination.'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question:
Whether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to exclude
an otherwise eligible student publication from participation in the student
activities fund, solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such
exclusion would violate the Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint of
the publication were non-religious.' 45

IV. THE DECISION
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority in Rosenberger held that the guidelines the SAF
used to deny funding to the petitioner, both in its terms and application, constituted a denial of the petitioner's right of free speech. "It is
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys."'" In affirming that

141.

Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 178-83.

142. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 281.
143. Id. at 279-81.
144. Id. at 281.
145. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.

146. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972)).
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the University's actions amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, the Supreme Court compared Rosenberger to Lamb's
Chapel.47 The Court determined, as it did in Lamb's Chapel, that
the petitioner's request was denied solely based upon the petitioner's
viewpoint."4 The Court pointed out that the University's SAF guidelines did not exclude religion as a topic, but instead prohibited publications produced from a religious editorial viewpoint. 49 It was the
prohibited prospective, not the subject matter, that resulted in the
denial of funds and thus denied the petitioner's right of free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 5 Therefore, the guidelines invoked by the University constituted a denial of WAP's right of free
speech and was not excused
by the necessity of complying with the
5
1
Clause.1
Establishment
The University attempted to distinguish their actions in
Rosenberger from the school board's action in Lamb's Chapel by
urging that their case involved funding rather than access to facilities.'52 Thus, the University asserted it should have the right to
make content-based decisions in the allocation of scarce resources. 53
The Court acknowledged that the University had a duty to allocate its
educational resources efficiently. 4 However, the Court also reaffirmed its viewpoint neutrality requirement for governmental allocations of financial benefits, by holding that "[t]he Government cannot
justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the eco-

147. Id. at 2518 (comparing Lamb's Chapel v. Center of Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)).
148. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
149. Id. at 2517.
150. Id. at 2517-18.
151. Id. at 2525.
152. Id. at 2518.
153. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276
(1981)). The Court noted:
There in the course of striking down a public university's exclusion of religious
groups from use of school facilities made available to all other student groups,
we stated: 'Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic
judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources."
Id.
154. Id.
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nomic fact of scarcity."' 55 Based on the stated principles of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and the neutrality requirement for
allocating funds, the Court found that the SAF's regulation acted as a
denial of the petitioner's right of free speech.'56
After deciding the free speech issue, the Court turned its attention
to the Establishment Clause. Curiously, however, the majority did not
utilize the three-prong-test of Lemon,'57 but instead stated that the
necessary inquiry looks to the purpose and object of the governmental
action and the practical details of the program's operation.'58 The
Court determined that the purpose of the SAF was to encourage an
open forum for speech, recognizing the diverse viewpoints of student
life.'59 The Court also noted that the University went to great
lengths to detach itself from the student journals by requiring each
organization to include in its publications a disclaimer of any University support of the organization's goals."6 The fact that the University required this disclaimer demonstrated that the University respected
the critical difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which violates he Establishment Clause, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Constitution protects by the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses. 6 '
The majority also addressed the issue of direct support to a religious organization. First, the Court noted that the funds in question
155. Id. at 2519.
156. Id. at 2525.
157. 403 U.S. at 612-13 (The three-pronged Lemon test states that, to withstand scrutiny, the government action must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit
religion in its principle or primary effect, and (3) not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.).
158. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
159. Id. at 2522.
160. Id. at 2514. The Court noted:
A standard agreement signed between each [student organization] and the University provides that the benefits and opportunities afforded to [student organizations]
"should not be misinterpreted as meaning that those organizations are part of or
controlled by the University, that the University is responsible for the
organizations' contracts or other acts or omissions, or that the University approves
of the organizations' goals or activities."
Id.
161. Id. at 2522-23.
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were from student fees and "not a general tax designed to raise revenue for the University."'62 Second, the disbursements go to a private
contractor for the cost of printing the student publications which are
protected under the First Amendment.
The funds would not be
directly distributed to WAP. The Court noted that "[t]his is a far cry
from a general public disbursement designed and effected to provide
financial support for a church."'" Third, the Court stated that WAP
is not the usual religious institution as defined by the Court's case
law or the University's own regulations. 6 Furthermore, WAP was
not seeking support as a religious organization but only as a student
journal."6 Therefore, any benefit to religion was incidental to the
SAF program's secular services provided for secular purposes on a
religion-neutral basis. 67
In conclusion, the Court declared that the significant factor in
upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause
attack is the programs neutrality towards religion. 6
The
Rosenberger Court held that the original intent of the government
program in question was neutral toward religion, and never intended a
purpose of advancing a specific religion or religion in general.'
The Court stated that when the government follows neutral criteria
and policies to extend benefits to recipients whose ideologies and
viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse, the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended. 7 Therefore, the Establishment Clause did not call for the University to violate WAP's
right of free speech.'

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 2522.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
Id.
Id. at 2524.
Id.
Id.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
Id. at 2522.
Id. at 2521.
Id. at 2525.
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B. The Concurring Opinions
1.

Justice O'Connor

Justice O'Connor began her concurring opinion by stressing the
importance of neutrality, 7 ' noting that neutrality is one hallmark of
the Establishment Clause. 73 Next, she acknowledged that Justice
Souter, in his dissent, recounted another axiom in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in that public funds may not be used to endorse
a religious message.7 Then, with the principles of neutrality and
the restriction on public funds in mind, Justice O'Connor began her
endorsement test analysis.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the University had clearly established a general program to encourage a free exchange of ideas.'75
As she continued her review of the University's program, Justice
O'Connor outlined three issues that led her to conclude that the Establishment Clause was not violated based upon an endorsement analysis. 76 First, at the University's insistence, the student organizations
were strictly independent.'" Second, the University had procedures
in place to ensure that the monies were distributed for permissive pur-

172. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 ("We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or
don't worship." Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). "[Tihe message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a
State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate
not neutrality but hostility toward religion." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion).
"The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no
warrant for discriminating against religion." Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J.).).
173. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
174. Id. at 2525 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 642 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
175. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
176. Id. at 2526.
177. Id. (citing the University's agreement with the organization, the Court stated:
The University is a Virginia public corporation and the CIO is not part of
that corporation, but rather exists and operates independently of the University . . . . The parties understand and agree that this Agreement is the only
source of any control the University may have over the CIO or its activities.).
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poses only.' Third, the assistance provided to a religious organization would not promote a perception of government endorsement of
the religious message because the widely divergent viewpoints of the
various groups, equally supported by the University, diminished the
'
danger of any perception of endorsement by the University. 79
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor stated that to deny WAP funds,
which are available to all other student publications, based on the
magazine's religious viewpoint, violates WAP's free speech right. '
Furthermore, because of the particular features of the University's
program - (1) the disclaimer; (2) the direct payment to third-party
vendors; and (3) the unliklihood of a perception of University endorsement - Justice O'Connor believed that the assistance requested
by WAP would not constitute an impermissible use of public
funds."8 ' Therefore, pursuant to this analysis, Justice O'Connor
82
joined in the opinion of the majority.
2.

Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion to address the
historical analysis presented by the dissent.13 The analyses of both
the dissent and Justice Thomas boiled down to a single issue: Did the
framers intend the Establishment Clause to bar all government financial aid, including programs designed for the beneficiaries to participate on an equal, neutral basis?
First, Justice Thomas addressed the principle that the United
States has a long tradition of allowing religious groups to participate
on equal terms in neutral government programs.' 84 He used the Vir-

178. Id. at 2527 (Noting that the way the funds were paid to third party vendors after
being approved ensures the funds were only being spent to further the University's purpose
in maintaining a free speech forum. Justice O'Connor compares this to a school providing
equal access to physical facilities.).
179. Id. at 2527.
180. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
184. Id.
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ginia debate on the so-called "Assessment Controversy" as the basis
for his opinion. The assessment was to be imposed for the support of
clergy for teaching religion.'85 Justice Thomas asserted that James
Madison's objection to that assessment was based not on the premise
that religious entities could not participate on equal terms, but instead
on the fact that the assessment singled out religious entities for special benefits.8 6 Furthermore, Justice Thomas cited examples of government support for religious entities. Such as, property tax exemption, 87 direct public funding of congressional chaplains,' and protection provided by city police and fire departments.'89
Finally, Justice Thomas' concurrence recognized that the Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been less than settled."9° He believed that Rosenberger offered an opportunity to reaffirm one basic
principle that has enjoyed a consensus:'' "The Clause does not
compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits
programs that are generally available to a broad class of partici'
pants."192
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In the dissent, Justice Souter proclaimed that even if the guidelines were a denial of freedom of speech, it was justified by the
necessity to comply with the Establishment Clause. 93 Initially, Justice Souter did not appear to differ with the majority's interpretation
of the law as much as the majority's interpretation of the facts. Jus-

185. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2528.
186. Id. at 2529.
187. Id. at 2531 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
188. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
189. Id. at 2532 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
190. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2532.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center of Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2141 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Board
of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1
(1989); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986); Mueller
v.Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981)).
193. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tice Souter asked, "Why does the Court not apply this clear law to
these clear facts and conclude, as I do, that the funding scheme is a
'
clear constitutional violation?"194
In answering, he implied that the
majority had failed to confront the evidence accurately.1 95 The majority described WAP's publication as a student journal with a religious viewpoint, which did not constitute a religious activity.' 96
However, Justice Souter clearly felt that the publication crossed the
line demarcating secular publications from evangelical publications, a
crossing which Justice Souter contended clearly violated the Establishment Clause. 97
The dissent also attacked the Court's use of the neutrality standard, noting that while neutrality was a relevant factor in Establishment Clause cases it was not dispositive' 98 Instead, Justice Souter
contended that the Court must look to see if the government program
is directly benefiting religion, and if so, the Establishment Clause
required more justification than evenhandedness.' 99
Unlike the majority, the dissent did not readily agree that the
student funds were not a tax.2' The dissent reasoned that since the
University exercised the power of the state to compel a student to pay
the fee, it was the equivalent of a tax.2"' Justice Souter claimed that,
at a minimum, the Establishment Clause stands for the proposition
that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 2 Moreover, he asserted that, by ordering the University to pay the petitioner
through the SAF, "[t]he Court is ordering an instrumentality of the

194. Id. at 2539-40.
195. Id. at 2540.

196. Id. at 2515-18.
197. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2540 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the "patently and
frankly evangelistic character of the magazine").
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2538.

201. Id.
202. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 385).
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State to support religious evangelism with direct funding."2 3 Therefore, even if the University did deny WAP's free speech rights, the
University's attempt to comply with the Establishment Clause justified
the discrimination. 4
However, Justice Souter also questioned whether the University
even violated the Free Speech Clause by denying the funding
request." 5 Viewpoint discrimination is based upon the premise that
the government should not skew debate by allowing one side to present its view while denying the opposing view.' Justice Souter felt
that, since the SAF guidelines denied funding to any group whose
message "prima:ily promotes or manifests" any view on the merits of
religion, the University was not practicing viewpoint discrimination.'
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

What does the future hold for Establishment Clause jurisprudence? On the basis of the current membership of the Supreme Court,
it would appear that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has taken a
new direction. In fact, the Court appears to have made an about-face
from the "wall of separation" approach to take an "accommodationist"
stance.
A.

Accommodationist as the Majority

Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that the Supreme Court Justices
can be categorized with respect to their church/state perspective as either: Accommodationists,
Separationists, or Centrists." 8
Accommodationists are those Justices that stray from using the Lemon
test and tend to accommodate religion by permitting aid to religious
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

oF

Id. at 2547.
Id.
Id.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
Id. at 2549.

DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE
AMEic
CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS 158 (1991) [hereinafter DAVIS].
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organizations as long as the program provides the aid without discrimination.2' Separationists on the other hand firmly believe in a strict
separation of church and state."' Finally, Centrists are simply those
Justices that fall in the middle, and perhaps lie closest to the Court's
official position of neutrality.'
Based upon these three categories, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
labeled five of the presently sitting Justices: Separationist - Justice
Stevens; Accommodationists - Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy; and Centrists Justices Souter and
O'Connor."' With respect to those Justices whom Chief Justice
Rehnquist has not labeled, it appears that Justice Thomas would side
with the Accommodationists; Justice Ginsberg with the Separationists
and Justice Breyer most probably with the Centrists.2" 3 Based on the
above classifications, the Accommodationists appear to have a four to
two advantage. However, it should be noted that the Centrists are
capable of providing the swing vote either way. Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor has a track record of siding with the
Accommodationists,2 14 while Justice Souter is also more likely an
Accommodationist than a Separationist." 5 The dominance of the
Accommodationists on the Court probably explains the Court's move
toward a more tolerant stance concerning the Establishment Clause.

209. Id. at 48.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 158.
212. DAVIS, supra note 208, at 160-62.
213. The likelihood of their category is based upon their participation in Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Rd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440 (1995) (The majority held that the state did not violate Establishment Clause of First
Amendment by permitting private party to display unattended cross on grounds of state
capitol. In this decision, Justice Thomas joined with the majority; Justice Bryer joined with
the concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsberg filed
a dissenting opinion.).
214. DAVIS, supra note 208, at 160.
215. Id. at 160-61.
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Another important trend shows that the most recent
Accommodationist cases have focused upon the right of religious
groups to gain equal access to public schools and public fora." 6 Beginning with Widmar v. Vincent,217 the Court held that a public university could not prevent a student religious group from meeting in
university classrooms after hours when similar non-religious groups
were given access. The Court applied the same rule to high schools in
Board of Education v. Mergens,218 requiring a high school to allow
church groups to use classrooms after school hours if other non-religious groups were allowed to do so. Finally, in Lamb's Chapel,"9
the Court required a high school to allow a Christian organization to
use the school facilities to show a Christian movie because other
groups were permitted to use the school for similar purposes.
C. An Objective Test and Neutrality
Finally, since Accommodationists are those Justices that stray
from using the Lemon test, it is significant to note that the majority
in Rosenberger did not cite the three-prong-test of Lemon. However,
Rosenberger does not stand for the principle that the Court has abandoned the Lemon test, for, in reality, there is no significant difference
between the Lemon test and the test applied in Rosenberger. The
"purpose and object of the governmental action '2 ° inquiry used in
Rosenberger is essentially identical to the first and second prongs of
Lemon. Likewise, "the practical details of the program's operation"" 1 inquiry from Rosenberger is not much different from looking into the government's excessive entanglement proscribed in the
third prong of Lemon. Therefore, the majority in Rosenberger revealed

216. Charles Roth, Comment, Rosenberger v. Rector
Chases Its Tail, 21 J.C. & U.L. 723, 746 (1995).
217. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
218. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
219. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
220. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
221. Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss1/14

The First Amendment Dog

30

Hicks: The Wall Crumbles: A Look at the Establishment Clause Rosenberger

1995]

ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR

that the Court is still concerned with some form of objective test to
review the substance of the program. This objective testing represents
the Supreme Court's effort to be neutral in religious matters.'m As
the Court continues to focus on the neutrality of the program in question, the Court is likely to continue relying on some form of an objective test like the Lemon test or a modified version.
The Rosenberger Court discussed at great length the importance
of neutrality towards religion.'m Rosenberger, appears to be a reaffirmation of those earlier cases that held that the Establishment Clause
is not violated by programs that extend benefits on a religion-neutral
basis. 4 The Court has held that "[i]t does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on
a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups that use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises."' The majority goes on to compare Rosenberger to the facilities cases and states that there is no
difference in "logic or principle" between the use of funding a facility to which student groups have access and paying a third-party
contractor to provide the facility on behalf of the school." Therefore, the majority found that if a government agency could expend
funds by allowing use of its facilities on a religion-neutral basis such
as in Lamb's Chapel, then it could pay third party creditor's for a
like purpose as in Rosenberger. 7
Justice O'Connor also linked the importance of neutrality towards
religion and the endorsement test in her concurring opinion.' Justice O'Connor noted the significance of neutrality when she pointed
out that the University supported, on an equal basis, widely divergent

222. DAVIS, supra note 208, at 158.
223. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-25.
224. Id. at 2523-24 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 and Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252);
see also Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (allowing access to school facilities on a
religion-neutral basis).
225. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 and Mergens,

496 U. S. at 252).
226. Id. at 2524.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
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opinions in many of the student publications.229 Then, turning to the
endorsement analysis, she found that the neutrality of the University's
SAF program and the diversity of the publications it supported, significantly diminished the danger that the message of any one publication was perceived as endorsed by the University."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Accommodationist majority in Rosenberger has continued the
trend of the Su-preme Court in putting an end to the belief that to
conform to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment the
government must exclude religion. Whereas the "strict separationist"
view followed a presumption of unconstitutionality if the government
was involved in any way with religion, the Court now requires a
compelling reason for the government to deny aid to religious groups
when it offers the same benefits to non-religious groups. The Court
suggests that government programs should treat a religious viewpoint
on an equal basis as other viewpoints. If there is a neutral government benefit, a concern for violating the Establishment Clause is not
a compelling reason to violate the free speech guarantee. Therefore, it
appears likely that the "wall of separation" has been razed and that it
will be easier in the future for religious groups to participate in aide
programs that the government administers in a religion-neutral manner, especially -when it concerns a freedom of speech issue. Even
Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion in Rosenberger, recognized
this trend when he stated, "The Court's contrary holding amounts to a
significant reformation of our viewpoint discrimination precedents and
will significantly expand access to limited-access forums."'"
The current make-up of the Supreme Court and the breakdown
between the Accommodationists, Separationists, and Centrists combined with the recent trend of accommodation decisions concerning
the rights of religious groups, produces a somewhat predictable future
for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Establishment

229. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2551.
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Clause cases are always fact specific and the swing vote provided by
the Centrists allows for an element of surprise. Finally, it is important
to remember a comment made by Justice Scalia during his tenure as a
United States Court of Appeals Judge: "[the] Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Establishment Clause in general... is in a
state of utter chaos and unpredictable change." 2
Paul L. Hicks

232. DAVIS, supra note 208, at 157.
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